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MANAGING ACQUISITIONS COMPLIANCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISE EXPANSION  
This article examines the major concerns when evaluating how to 
ensure compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) for a 
franchise looking to expand internationally, and from this examination, 
to craft the best approach to ensuring compliance with the FCPA. Couple 
franchising’s exponential growth and reliance on third parties for expan-
sion of the franchise system with the recent crack down on FCPA com-
pliance by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the De-
partment of Justice (DOJ), and there is the perfect storm regarding risk to 
the franchisor of inadvertently creating liability under the FCPA. By 
adopting a commitment to non-tolerance of bribery or otherwise corrupt 
practices, as well as adopting a system-wide, robust, and comprehensive 
anti-corruption compliance program, franchises expanding international-
ly can mitigate their unique risks regarding the commission or imputation 
of potential FCPA violation within the franchise system. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recall the blazing headlines from earlier this spring exclaiming that 
twenty FIFA officials (and counting) were being indicted on various cor-
ruption related offenses resulting from the government uncovering a 
massive twenty-four year scheme resulting in FIFA officials and their 
subsidiaries received over $150 million in bribes from sports marketing 
companies in order to secure marketing at the World Cup and other FIFA 
events. In addition, there were allegations of senior officials receiving 
over $10 million in exchange for securing their votes as to where certain 
future world cups would be held.1 The FIFA prosecution and investiga-
tion is ongoing and has brought into question the legitimacy of hosting 
rights awarded to Russia and Qatar in 2018 and 2022, respectively.2 
While this case certainly highlights the prevalence of corruption (and 
current focus on halting) within the way business is secured throughout 
the world, the FIFA case has not resulted in any charges specifically of 
FCPA violations because, since FIFA is not a “public international or-
ganization,” its officials are not “foreign officials” for FCPA purposes.3 
However, the broad jurisdiction of the FCPA not reaching this case is 
more the exception than the norm. Instead, the norm is that the FCPA 
typically will apply—evidenced by the growing number of individuals 
and companies, like Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company (2015), BNY 
  
 1. 2015 Mid-Year FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN (July 6, 2015), 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2015-Mid-Year-FCPA-Update.pdf. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
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Mellon (2015), Ralph Lauren Corporation (2013), and Garth Peterson of 
Morgan Stanley (2014), appearing in the headlines in recent years due to 
FCPA violations (just to name a few).4 The increase over the past dec-
ade5 of FCPA enforcement actions undertaken by the DOJ and the SEC 
against companies as well as individuals make clear that ensuring FCPA 
compliance is one of the agencies’ top priorities, and as such, should be a 
major strategic concern for businesses operating abroad. In fact, the DOJ 
recently stated that FCPA enforcement is number two of the agency’s 
priorities around the world, second only to anti-terrorism.6  
On the other hand, franchising has become a major economic force, 
and according to statistics reported by the International Franchise Asso-
ciation,7 currently, there are “over 750,000 franchised business estab-
lishments employing more than eight million people and generating ap-
proximately $800 billion (annually).”  Franchising, is a business system 
based on expansion through the establishment of licensing relationships. 
Franchising provides an attractive model for international expansion for 
a number of reasons. First, franchising offers a somewhat simple avenue 
for growing an already known brand and proven system.8 Second, the 
potential foreign franchisees provide knowledge and expertise of the 
local foreign market.9 Third, franchising, compared to other methods of 
expansion, is relatively speedy and has limited associated expenses for 
the franchisor.10 From data reported through a survey of 1,600 American 
franchises conducted by the International Franchise Association,11 “near-
ly two-thirds of respondents currently franchise or operate in non-U.S. 
markets and three-fourths planned to begin international expansion ef-
forts immediately.” With franchising’s explosive growth, it is not hard to 
fathom that franchising’s international expansion would alert the radar of 
the agencies enforcing the FCPA. Couple the crackdown regarding 
FCPA enforcement with the exponential growth and expansion seen of 
late in the franchising sector, and there exists the “perfect storm” of po-
tential for liability under the FCPA. This is particularly so when the 
unique aspects of how a franchise system expands are also considered.  
As quoted in a recent article in Franchising World,  
  
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Beth Mattson-Teig, High Risk, FRANCHISE TIMES,  
http://www.franchisetimes.com/October-2012/High-Risk/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2015). 
 7. Francis N. Rodriquez & Jessica A. McGrath, M&A Franchise Deals: Does it Register, 
STOUT RISIUS ROSS, http://www.srr.com/article/ma-franchise-deals-does-it-register (last visited Nov. 
18, 2015). 
 8. U.S. Franchisors Expanding Abroad Must Consider FCPA Risks, LAW360 (May 29, 
2015, 8:35 AM ET), http://www.law360.com/articles/660922/us-franchisors-expanding-abroad-
must-consider-fcpa-risks?article_related_content=1. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
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“Franchising has undergone titanic shifts over the past decades. Once 
the purveyors of single products or services, today’s franchise sys-
tems have morphed into mega distribution networks offering goods 
and services through multiple channels on a global basis. As the 
world becomes more regulatory-minded, legal issues facing franchise 
systems have become more complex and far reaching.”12 
One of these major legal concerns is compliance with anti-
corruption legislation, like the FCPA. The FCPA is said to be the “single 
most significant compliance challenge” for companies operating interna-
tionally.13 Because of the upswing of FCPA enforcement actions over the 
past few years and the expansive jurisdiction and numerous potential 
causes of action created by the substantive provisions of the FCPA, in-
cluding the potential for liability based on actions of agents or within the 
corporate family of entities, addressing FCPA compliance should be a 
core concern when crafting corporate strategy.14 Although no enforce-
ment action has been taken against a franchisor based on the actions of 
its franchisees,15 franchises and similar business systems have been 
linked to enforcement actions in other ways.16 This paper aims to show 
how easily the potential for liability under the FCPA translates to expan-
sion of the franchise system and to provide a compliance-based solution 
to mitigating this risk. To do so, in Section II, the paper will first exam-
ine the causes of action and jurisdiction created under the FCPA. Then, 
Section III will discuss the unique characteristics of the franchise rela-
tionship and how the franchisor’s reliance on third parties by virtue of 
the way franchising expands poses clear risk for potential FCPA viola-
tion and associated liability on behalf of the franchisor. Finally, Section 
IV offers a solution to mitigating the franchise’s unique FCPA risks from 
a compliance perspective. Essentially, by adopting a commitment to non-
tolerance of bribery or otherwise corrupt practices, as well as adopting a 
system-wide, robust, and comprehensive anti-corruption compliance 
program, franchises expanding internationally can mitigate their unique 
risks regarding the commission or imputation of potential FCPA viola-
tion within their franchise system. 
  
 12. Why Franchise Organizations Need Corporate Compliance Programs, FRANCHISING 
WORLD, http://franchisingworld.com/why-franchise-organizations-need-corporate-compliance-
programs/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2015). 
 13. FCPA Risks for Franchisors, LAW360 (Nov. 7, 2013, 4:00 PM ET), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/487109/fcpa-risks-for-franchisors?article_related_content=1. 
 14. U.S. Franchisors Expanding Abroad Must Consider FCPA Risks, supra note 8. 
 15. FCPA Risks for Franchisors, supra note 13, 
 16. Erik King, International Franchising and the FCPA (Part One): Vicarious Liability, THE 
FCPA BLOG (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2015/1/26/international-franchising-
and-the-fcpa-part-one-vicarious-li.html#sthash.VLZag8cW.dpuf. 
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II. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE FCPA 
This section introduces the FCPA,17 which is the major domestic 
law regulating American businesses’ interaction in foreign countries. 
Then, the regulation’s jurisdiction, potential causes of action, and thus, 
the risk to companies associated with the broad potential for liability 
under the FCPA is discussed. While other domestic laws influence com-
panies’ dealings in foreign countries, like import and export tariffs and 
tax laws, and other countries have their own applicable anti-corruption 
legislation, this paper concentrates on the impact of the FCPA as to how 
it creates risk specific to the franchise looking to expand internationally.  
The purpose of the FCPA is to make it unlawful for certain catego-
ries of entities or individuals to make payments to foreign government 
officials in order to obtain or retain business.18 The statute was enacted in 
1977 with the overarching goals of reducing corruption when doing 
business with foreign countries and leveling the playing field regarding 
foreign transactions.19 The FCPA contains anti-bribery provisions as well 
as books and records “accounting” provisions, designed to operate in 
tandem.20 Liability for violation of any provision of the FCPA can be 
imposed on both entities and individuals and can result in civil and crim-
inal penalties.21 Both the DOJ and the SEC enforce the FCPA by investi-
gating the actions of companies that fall under the reach of the FCPA’s 
jurisdiction to ensure compliance with the statute’s substantive provi-
sions and imposing penalties for its violation through enforcement ac-
tions in federal court.22 The DOJ primarily focuses on the anti-bribery 
provisions, while the SEC primarily focuses on “issuers” and the ac-
counting provisions.23 
A. The Substantive Provisions of the FCPA 
As stated in the FCPA Resource Guide issued by the DOJ and SEC 
in 2012 (the Resource Guide), generally, through its anti-bribery provi-
sions, the FCPA “prohibits offering to pay, paying, promising to pay, or 
authorizing the payment of money or anything of value to a foreign offi-
cial in order to influence any act or decision of the foreign official in his 
or her official capacity or to secure any other improper advantage in or-
der to obtain or retain business.”24 Specifically, the anti-bribery provi-
  
 17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1–dd-3 (2012). 
 18. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/foreign-corrupt-practices-act (last visited Nov. 23, 2015). 
 19. The FCPA & What Every International Franchisor Must Know, INTERNATIONAL 
FRANCHISE ASSOCIATION, http://www.franchise.org/sites/default/files/ek-pdfs/html_page/Foreign-
Corrupt-Practices-Act_2.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2015). 
 20. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note 18. 
 21. Id. 
 22. The FCPA & What Every International Franchisor Must Know, supra note 19. 
 23. Id. 
 24. A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, 10 (Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf. 
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sions apply to the use of the mail or any means or instrumentality of in-
terstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of making payment to any 
person with the knowledge that such payment will be used to improperly 
influence a foreign official for the purpose of securing business for the 
payor or payor’s principal.25 From the language of its anti-bribery provi-
sions, the FCPA clearly creates a broad risk for liability regarding what 
could constitute bribery or corrupt practices. Essentially, the FCPA ap-
plies if its “Business Purpose Test” is met. This test states that the FCPA 
applies to any payment intended to induce or influence a foreign official 
to use his or her position “in order to assist … in obtaining or retaining 
business for or with, or directing business to, any person.”26 The key 
point to understand here is exactly how broadly the anti-bribery provi-
sions can be applied under the FCPA. 
As for the accounting provisions, these apply only to companies 
whose securities are listed in the United States.27 These provisions re-
quire the companies to which they apply, “a) make and keep books and 
records that accurately and fairly reflect the transactions of the corpora-
tion, and b) devise and maintain an adequate system of internal account-
ing controls.”28 Essentially, the accounting provisions “seek to prevent 
accounting practices designed to hide corrupt payments by requiring 
companies to maintain accurate books and records and adequate internal 
accounting controls.”29 It is important to note that intent (as in a purpose 
to defraud) is not required to prove a books and records violation and the 
accounting requirements extend to a parent companies’ foreign and do-
mestic subsidiaries, meaning the parent company must assure its subsidi-
aries and affiliates are compliant with the requirements of the provi-
sion.30 This paper focuses mainly on the potential for liability to the in-
ternationally expanding franchise created through the anti-bribery provi-
sions. Nevertheless, understanding the requirements and applicability of 
the accounting provisions is necessary for the franchisor to ensure accu-
rate and thorough records are kept throughout its franchise system. 
B. The Broad Jurisdiction of the FCPA  
The FCPA is set up with broad jurisdiction regarding to whom the 
restrictions of its provisions apply. The provisions of the FCPA apply to 
those with formal ties to the United States, “issuers” and “domestic con-
cerns,” as well as having a broader territorial jurisdiction that covers per-
  
 25. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note 18. 
 26. A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note 24, at 12. 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2012).  
 28. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note 18. 




 30. The FCPA & What Every International Franchisor Must Know, supra note 19. 
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sons and entities (other than issuers and domestic concerns) acting while 
in the territory of the United States.31 An “issuer”32 under the FCPA is a 
company that has a “class of securities registered under Section 12 of the 
Exchange Act or is required to file periodic and other reports with SEC 
under Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act.” This means that, to be an is-
suer, a company need not be a U.S. company. Foreign companies listed 
on a U.S. exchange that have American Depository Receipts are also 
issuers.33 The second category of entities or persons the FCPA applies to 
are “domestic concerns,” defined in the Resource Guide as, “any indi-
vidual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States, or any 
entity that is a corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, 
business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship orga-
nized under the laws of the United States or its states, territories, posses-
sions, or commonwealths or that has its principal place of business in the 
United States, including the entities’ officers, directors, employees, 
agents, or stockholders acting on behalf of a domestic concern, including 
foreign nationals or companies.”34 Particularly applicable to companies 
with formal ties to the United States, principles of corporate liability ap-
ply regarding violations of the FCPA as well. Meaning that, a company 
can be held liable for the actions of its agents or subsidiaries, if the viola-
tions were committed within the scope of the parent-subsidiary relation-
ship or the agent’s employment with the company and, at least in part, to 
benefit the company (and the requisite knowledge or willful blindness) 
on behalf of the company can be shown.35 The FCPA also has broader 
territorial jurisdiction that covers those “who take action in furtherance 
of a violation” while in the territory of the United States.36 Since its 
amendment in 1998, the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions have been ex-
tended through this territorial jurisdiction to apply to “foreign persons 
and foreign non-issuer entities that, either directly or through an agent, 
engage in any act in furtherance of a corrupt payment (or an offer, prom-
ise, or authorization to pay),” and can extend to agents, employees, offic-
ers, directors, or stockholders of such persons or entities.37 Essentially, 
through its jurisdiction over those with formal ties to the United States or 
its territorial jurisdiction, the FCPA can reach just about any person or 
any entity with some connection to the United States that engages in 
some broadly defined corrupt act, as long as this corrupt act meets the 
Business Purpose Test.  
  
 31. A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note 24. 
 32. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012). 
 33. A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note 24, at 11. 
 34. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (2012). 
 35. International Trade Compliance Tips for Franchisors, LAW360 (March 18, 2015, 10:58 
AM ET), http://www.law360.com/articles/631950/international-trade-compliance-tips-for-
franchisors. 
 36. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 (2012). 
 37. A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note 24, at 11. 
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As mentioned above, general principles of corporate liability and 
respondeat superior (or vicarious liability) apply to the FCPA. This 
means that, as stated in the Resource Guide, “a company is liable when 
its directors, officers, employees, or agents, acting within the scope of 
their employment, commit FCPA violations intended, at least in part, to 
benefit the company.”38 Ultimately, if it can be shown that an individual 
acting in violation of the FCPA did so within the scope of his or her rela-
tionship with the company in some way for the betterment of the compa-
ny, the violation can be imputed onto the company (as long as the requi-
site knowledge or willful blindness on behalf of the company regarding 
the action can also be proven). The DOJ and the SEC commonly use 
parent-subsidiary liability when bringing FCPA enforcement actions.39 
According to the Resource Guide, there are two ways a parent can be 
held liable for actions taken by its subsidiaries in violation of the anti-
bribery provisions of the FCPA. First, a parent may have “participated 
sufficiently in the activity” to be directly liable for the conduct (i.e. di-
recting the misconduct or participating in the bribe scheme), and second, 
through “traditional agency principles.”40 However, the agency standard 
the DOJ applies is actually more expansive than traditional notions of 
agency applied to cases involving parent-subsidiary liability.41 The Re-
source Guide states that the determinative factor in assessing whether the 
agency standard applies to impute an FCPA violation by the subsidiary 
(or its agent) onto the parent company is the parent’s general control over 
the subsidiary.42 In contrast, the determinative factor under traditional 
notions of agency liability is the parent’s control over illegal conduct.43 
Essentially, “whether or not a parent specifically authorized, directed or 
controlled the actions of a subsidiary, if the government finds that an 
agency relationship of general control exists, the parent may be liable for 
FCPA violations committed by the subsidiary.”44 The enforcing agencies 
consider not only the formal structure of the entities’ relationship, but 
also the “practical realities of how the entities interact.”45 If an agency 
relationship is determined to exist, then the subsidiary’s action and 
knowledge are imputed to its parent.46 
  
 38. Id. at 27. 
 39. See Trends and Development in Anti-Corruption Enforcement, COVINGTON & BURLING 
LLP, 14 (Winter 2015), https://www.cov.com/files/Publication/446fa508-b853-4f88-a902-
615eb62a28aa/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/1c4f86eb-6ce7-4115-aed6-
67bd2d1e5ee6/Trends_and_Developments_in_Anti-Corruption_Enforcement_Winter_2015.pdf. 
 40. Id. 
 41. PLC Commercial, New FCPA Guidance Released by the DOJ and SEC, (Nov. 15, 2012), 
Practical Law Legal Update 6-522-4695 (last visited Nov. 20, 2015). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note 24, at 27. 
 46. Id. 
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Another way an indirect violation of the FCPA can reach a compa-
ny is through principles of successor liability. The Resource Guide 
makes clear that the enforcing agencies take the position that a company 
assumes the liabilities of any company with which it merges or that it 
acquires, including liability for FCPA violations47 (the potential for suc-
cessor liability can be mitigated however through due diligence, integra-
tion, and taking remedial action, some of which will be discussed in Sec-
tion IV).48 However, the Resource Guide also notes, “successor liability 
does not create liability where none existed before.”49 Therefore, if an 
issuer acquired a foreign company not previously subject to the FCPA’s 
jurisdiction, meaning the acquired company was not an issuer or a do-
mestic concern and the FCPA’s territorial jurisdiction did not apply, then 
the mere acquisition of that foreign company would not retroactively 
create FCPA liability for the acquiring issuer. But, the acquiring compa-
ny would need to ensure no future violation occurred after the acquisi-
tion, as such violation would be subject to the FCPA. Accordingly, be-
cause the FCPA has been interpreted by the DOJ and SEC (and affirmed 
in the courts50) as having such expansive jurisdiction, not only must a 
company be aware of whether it falls under the jurisdiction of the FCPA, 
but it must also understand whether jurisdiction can be established in 
order to create liability on behalf of the company for actions of various 
third parties.51  
The overall “take away” regarding the obligations and liabilities 
created for companies and individuals under the FCPA is that the SEC 
and DOJ “investigate, settle and prosecute violations of the FCPA occur-
ring both domestically and internationally, and as such, companies that 
operate directly or through affiliated or unaffiliated parties, particularly 
in developing and transitioning countries, may be vulnerable to FCPA 
enforcement and should ensure compliance.”52 This section introduced 
the FCPA through a discussion of its broad jurisdiction and the potential 
causes of action it creates for businesses and individuals who have con-
nections to foreign markets. This introduction to the FCPA provides the 
foundation for understanding how the particularities of the franchise rela-
tionship and the way franchises expand create specific potential for risk 
of liability under the FCPA as the franchise moves abroad. This franchise 
specific risk will be discussed in the next section in order to show why 
the implementation of a robust and comprehensive compliance system 
reaching all levels of the franchise system is the answer to proactively 
  
 47. Id. at 28. 
 48. See PLC Commercial, supra note 41. 
 49. A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note 24, at 28. 
 50. United States v. Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d 535, 540 n.31 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 51. Such third parties include: the company’s employees, agents, or subsidiaries, plus its 
subsidiaries’ agents, as well as actions taken by any company with which it merges or acquires (and 
that company’s agents). 
 52. PLC Commercial, supra note 41.  
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mitigating the risks specifically applicable to franchises expanding inter-
nationally created by the FCPA.  
III. MAJOR CONCERNS IN THE FRANCHISE SYSTEM CREATING RISK OF 
LIABILITY UNDER THE FCPA 
This section will first examine differing approaches to international 
expansion applicable in the franchise system and how these approaches 
fit within the broad jurisdiction and potential causes of action created 
under the FCPA. Then, how each of these approaches impacts the fran-
chisor’s potential for liability under the various applications of the FCPA 
will be discussed. This analysis will highlight how the broad jurisdiction 
of the FCPA applies easily to the unique aspects of international fran-
chise expansion in order to clarify the importance of taking a proactive 
approach to addressing these risks. Because of the various ways the fran-
chising system expands, its reliance on third parties for entry into foreign 
markets, and the typically incurred “red tape” when moving into foreign 
markets (i.e. licensing, approvals, regulatory authorizations and require-
ments), there is often temptation to “grease the skids” on the way in 
through providing “kick backs” or other payments to agents or other of-
ficials aimed at expediting the market entry process.53 Nonetheless, this 
shortcutting or otherwise easing entry into the foreign system is a sure-
fire way for the franchisor to be implicated in violation of the FCPA, 
whether or not the violation occurred at the corporate level. 
A. How Franchises Fit under the Jurisdiction of the FCPA 
Franchises fit under the jurisdiction of the FCPA clearly as issuers if 
they are public companies expanding internationally.54 However, for 
those franchise entities that do not rise to the level of being an issuer, the 
domestic concern jurisdiction is still broadly applicable enough that it is 
easy to see how it likely applies to the domestic franchisor expanding 
internationally. As explained in depth in Section I, an entity is a domestic 
concern if it is an entity that is organized under, or a resident of, or has 
its principal place of business within the United States or any US territo-
ry.55 Thus, a domestic-based franchise, specifically its domestic based 
franchisor, constitutes a “domestic concern” under the FCPA.  
The FCPA also creates a likely risk of violation specific to the fran-
chisor through its broad interpretation of vicarious and agency liability 
discussed in Section I (the franchisor would also be subject to a potential 
for any other entity-based liability discussed in Section I, like successor 
liability). Thus, in the franchising system, like any other entity subject to 
the principles of vicarious or agency liability, any party related to the 
  
 53. Franchisors & Franchisees: Understanding Compliance Risk, STEELE CIS, 1 (2015), 
http://www.steelecis.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2015/03/CIS-2031504.pdf. 
 54. See A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note 24, at 11. 
 55. See International Trade Compliance Tips for Franchisors, supra note 35.  
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franchisor either through employment or entity relationships that could 
be considered to be under the general control of the franchisor by the 
DOJ (or SEC) attaches the broad application of agency liability provided 
for under the enforcing agencies’ interpretation of the FCPA. Once the 
vicarious or agency liability is established, any violation by such a relat-
ed party could then be imputed onto the franchisor.  
B. Franchisees and the Potential for Agency Liability  
What about risk specific to the franchising system through its rela-
tionship with its franchisees? While to date there have been no enforce-
ment actions against franchisors based on actions taken by its foreign 
franchisees, franchises and similar business structures, like distributor-
ships, have been otherwise connected to enforcement actions.56 It is not 
hard to see how franchisees could fit under the expansive jurisdiction of 
the FCPA and broad definition of agency applied when considering 
FCPA liability.57 If the enforcing agencies were to move their FCPA 
crackdown into the realm of franchising and consider whether the fran-
chisor could be implicated in the conduct of its franchisees with regards 
to a potential FCPA violation, the likely considerations include the de-
gree of control the franchisor exerted over the franchisee and the franchi-
sor’s knowledge (actual or constructive or willful blindness) of the al-
leged misconduct.58 Franchisees typically fit the enforcing agencies’ 
interpretation of agency for FCPA purposes easily based on the general 
control test used for FCPA purposes. The basics of the franchise relation-
ship are a license to use the franchise’s trademarks and system set up 
through the obligations of the franchise agreement. But, almost always, 
the franchisor exerts some continuing degree of control over the franchi-
see’s operations in order to ensure consistency across its brand.59 This 
level of control would likely be enough to constitute the exertion of gen-
eral control by the franchisor over the franchisee, satisfying the enforcing 
agencies’ broad applicability of agency principles under the FCPA.60 As 
a result, the franchisor would be implicated in the actions of its fran-
chisees based on the existence of the agency relationship. In addition, in 
domestic litigation involving franchises, the doctrine of vicarious liabil-
ity is often invoked to implicate the franchisor in the actions of its fran-
chisees.61 Numerous domestic courts have held that “the franchise rela-
  
 56. U.S. Franchises Expanding Abroad Must Consider FCPA Risk, supra note 8; King, supra 
note 16. 
 57. U.S. Franchises Expanding Abroad Must Consider FCPA Risk, supra note 8. 
 58. Id. 
 59. International Franchising Methods, FRANCHISING DEVELOPMENT SERVICES, 
http://www.fdsfranchise.com/international-franchising-methods.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 
2015). 
 60. Id. 
 61. David A. Beyer, Vicarious Liability, INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISE ASSOCIATION (2006), 
http://www.franchise.org/sites/default/files/ek-pdfs/html_page/VICARIOUS-LIABILITY-_David-
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tionship becomes an agency relationship when the franchisor exerts sig-
nificant control over the subject matter of the litigation.”62 Thus, given 
the long reach and broad applicability of the FCPA, it is not hard to fath-
om that enforcement agencies would constitute franchisees to be agents 
of the franchisor for purposes of FCPA liability. Establishing this agency 
would simply require the enforcing agency to establish: 1) the franchisee 
was under the general control of the franchisor when it took the action, 2) 
the low threshold that the conduct of the franchisee was a violation of the 
act, 3) the improper conduct was taken on behalf of the franchise with 
the purpose to “obtain or retain business or secure an improper business 
advantage,” and 4) that the franchisor was either willfully blind to or had 
knowledge of this conduct, whether directly or with “a belief that cir-
cumstances exist that such conduct is substantially certain to occur.”63 
Thus, when expanding abroad and approaching FCPA compliance, the 
smart franchise must balance maintaining enough control to protect their 
brand while still keeping the franchise “reasonably at arm’s length” in 
order to attempt to prevent the franchisee being considered an agent of 
the franchisor should an FCPA concern arise.64 
Other factors, beyond the ability to establish franchisees as agents 
of the franchisor, could contribute to the enforcement agencies taking an 
interest in FCPA enforcement within the franchise sector. These include: 
the structure of initial licensing as well as royalty fees common in fran-
chise systems, the fact that it is always in the interest of the franchisor for 
the particular franchisee to succeed, any intent the franchisor may have 
appeared to impose upon its franchisees, and the necessary government 
interaction regarding the set-up of a new franchise system or location.65 
There are also factors specific to how a franchise expands internationally 
that make the system susceptible to a potential for FCPA violation. These 
include: the franchisor having a limited knowledge of the local customs 
and practices in foreign markets while dealing with existing entities or 
established business persons (potential franchisees) who do have local 
knowledge, increased dealings with foreign vendors and suppliers (in 
order to ensue the ability to source and supply products and services con-
sistent with the established brand), the need for direct interaction with 
local government officials regarding licensing and registration require-
ments, purchasing or leasing franchise locations, dealing with customs 
and import/export requirements, and the use of agents to assist with entry 
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and expansion in the local market, as well as the specific structure of 
international expansion that is chosen.66 All of these various factors, as 
well as the likelihood that the actions of franchisees will impute onto the 
franchisor through the establishment of an agency relationship under the 
FCPA, highlight franchising’s specific potential for risk of liability under 
the FCPA. The impact of the chosen expansion method in particular will 
be discussed in the next subsection. 
C. The Way Franchising Expands and the Associated Risk for Liability 
under the FCPA 
By its nature as a system based on licensing, franchising expands 
through reliance on third parties. There are a few different avenues the 
franchisor looking to expand internationally can pursue. The most com-
mon approach to international franchise expansion is through the crea-
tion of a master franchise agreement, where the franchise either creates a 
wholly owned domestic subsidiary (its international sub-franchisor),67 
creates or acquires an existing foreign company to be its foreign subsidi-
ary (the controlled foreign corporation),68 or licenses an existing foreign 
entity to be its exclusive mater franchisor within that country.69 The for-
eign master franchisor, typically under some control of the franchisor, 
then opens master franchisor operator locations or grants multiple for-
eign franchisee licenses throughout the foreign territory according to the 
franchisor’s franchise agreement.70 There are a variety of other methods 
of international expansion for the franchise system, including:  
 Acquisition of an existing foreign franchise system and merging 
the two (think Burger King and Tim Horton),71  
 Direct franchising where the franchisor directly grants each for-
eign franchisee,72 
 Area or regional development where there is a master-sub-
franchisor but the territory only covers a region or specific area in-
stead of a whole country,73 
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 The franchisor opening its own operator locations within the for-
eign market,74  
 The franchisor entering into a joint venture with an existing for-
eign franchise, or 
 The franchisor acquiring only the assets of an existing foreign 
franchise and merging them into its existing system (through essen-
tially buying an existing brand and trademark rights, in an asset ac-
quisition that doesn’t take on the liabilities).75 
There also has been an increase in international holding companies 
or other investment groups purchasing existing franchise systems, such 
as 3G Capital Group’s recent purchase of Burger King Holdings, Inc. or 
Berkshire Hathaway’s purchase of Dairy Queen.76  
Essentially, when choosing how to structure the franchise’s interna-
tional expansion, the potential forms sit on a spectrum. At one end is the 
use of master franchising that reduces FCPA risk for the franchisor be-
cause the franchisor exerts less control over the master franchisee who 
then has greater operating flexibility.77 But, with less control on the part 
of the franchisor comes less ability to regulate and protect its developed 
brand and brand consistency, and may incentivize the franchisee to shirk 
its obligations to the franchisor (such as adherence to compliance pro-
grams).78 On the other end of this spectrum sits direct unit franchising 
where the franchisor directly licenses individual foreign franchisees.79 
The pros and cons here are reversed, the franchisor maintains more con-
trol over each franchisee, which allows for greater brand protection and 
the ability to ensure the franchisee is complying with the franchises’ sys-
tem at the expense of the franchisor taking on a greater risk for the impu-
tation of potential FCPA liability.80 Along this continuum lies the various 
hybrid structures mentioned earlier and each franchise system’s unique 
needs and concerns will determine its chosen structure. Nevertheless, the 
most prominent consideration (aside from brand protection) when choos-
ing an expansion tactic is that, because of the differing entity structures, 
varying amount of control the franchisor maintains over the foreign fran-
chisees, and concerns regarding agency or vicarious liability for the fran-
chisor, the amount of risk and potential liability for FCPA violation cre-
ated depends on the method of expansion the franchisor chooses when 
moving abroad.81 Thus, the chosen method of international expansion 
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becomes the first way the franchisor can mitigate its potential for liability 
if FCPA violations should occur within its entity structure. Because of 
the broad potential for liability relating to FCPA issues, this considera-
tion should be a key aspect when choosing how to structure the fran-
chise’s international expansion.  
Some companies have tried to avoid the FCPA and successor liabil-
ity by structuring their expansion as only an asset purchase, in order to 
avoid taking on the acquired entity’s liabilities and thus potential respon-
sibility for any FCPA violation.82 In franchising, this could be done 
through purchasing a foreign franchise’s trademarks in order to allow the 
franchisor to move into the foreign market with established brand recog-
nition. But, using an asset purchase to avoid FCPA and successor liabil-
ity is not always successful because courts recognize this tactic and will 
impute the liability to the acquiring company anyway.83  
While acquiring or merging with an existing foreign franchisee 
seems to be the most straightforward approach to international franchise 
expansion, this structure of expansion is not seen as commonly in inter-
national franchising expansion, and alliances like that between Burger 
King and Tim Hortons are still uncommon in the franchising industry. 
This is likely because of brand protection concerns related to integra-
tion.84 However, this approach, which is more typical of what is seen in 
mergers and acquisitions, provides the ability to address FCPA concerns 
before closing and once the deal goes through. On the front side of the 
deal, through risk-based methodological due diligence to ensure the fran-
chisor isn’t purchasing an FCPA violation via the application of succes-
sor liability, and on the back side of the deal, through integration and the 
adoption of a robust and comprehensive compliance program at all levels 
of the new entity. As such, international expansion of franchise systems 
through the more standard merger or acquisition will likely be an area 
that becomes more mainstream as franchising continues to move onto a 
global scale.  
It is clear the DOJ and SEC, through various enforcement actions, 
have established their ability to impute liability for a subsidiary’s FCPA 
violation onto its parent by virtue of the parent-subsidiary relationship 
and the principle of vicarious liability.85 Thus, it is not hard to see that, in 
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this same vein, by using the FCPA’s broad applicability of the principle 
of agency liability, the DOJ or SEC could clearly translate the potential 
for liability based on entity relationships into holding a franchisor liable 
for the actions of its franchisees. Thus, in expanding the franchise sys-
tem, not only must the franchisor consider how its corporate agents inter-
act when foreign officials are involved, but also, depending on the cho-
sen structure of the expansion of its franchise system, the franchisor must 
consider the actions of numerous parties potentially acting as the franchi-
sor’s agents in the foreign country, from subsidiaries to master sub-
franchisors to foreign franchisees. This is why the method of expansion 
into foreign markets must be a core consideration when the franchise is 
structuring its foreign expansion, in order to account for the potential for 
risk of FCPA liability due to the unique structure of the franchise rela-
tionship and the methods typically seen in international franchise expan-
sion. Ultimately, choosing an expansion structure that provides for lim-
ited liability while ensuring the franchisor is able to protect its brand and 
system by determining to whom and how franchisee licenses are granted 
is the best strategic option for the franchisor looking to expand interna-
tionally. The chosen structure of the franchise’s international expansion 
also impacts how it addresses ensuring that its compliance program is 
adhered to at all levels of its franchise system. This extra layer of adher-
ence is the key to addressing compliance within the franchise system and 
will be discussed further in the next section.  
This section discussed the ways the franchise system expands inter-
nationally and how this structure of the franchise system sets up the fran-
chisor to be exposed to an expanded potential for liability under the 
FCPA by looking at unique traits of franchise expansion and how they fit 
clearly within the broad jurisdiction the FCPA creates. The next section 
argues for why putting in place a robust and comprehensive compliance 
system that reaches all levels of the franchise system is the answer to 
mitigating this potential for risk of liability under the FCPA. 
IV. THE ANSWER: A ROBUST AND COMPREHENSIVE COMPLIANCE 
PROGRAM  
The previous sections pointed out that because of the explosive 
growth and expansive reach of the franchising sector and the growing 
trend regarding FCPA enforcement; it is easy to see how the DOJ and 
SEC could move the FCPA enforcement quest into the realm of the fran-
chise system. Then, the discussion introduced the FCPA, explained how 
it creates risk for companies expanding internationally who do not pay 
attention to its broad jurisdiction and causes of action, and analyzed how 
the specific ways franchises expand internationally pose a heightened 
risk of exposure to FCPA violation. This section provides an answer to 
mitigating this risk of FCPA violation for the franchisor through the 
adoption of a robust and comprehensive compliance system through all 
levels of the franchise organization. First, the reasons why the compli-
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ance program is the answer is discussed. Next, what the compliance pro-
gram looks like specific to the franchise system is considered. Finally, 
the aspects of compliance unique within the franchise system, the fact 
that the franchisor has to ensure its adherence all the way through its 
numerous franchisees, and how the franchisor addresses this kind of 
“third layer” to its compliance program are explained. Ultimately, the 
goal of this section is to glean the core aspects a franchisor should adopt 
in order to craft a robust and comprehensive compliance system that ful-
ly addresses the risks regarding FCPA compliance that are unique to 
international expansion of the franchise system. 
A.  Why the Adoption of a Robust and Comprehensive Compliance Pro-
gram that Reaches All Levels of the Franchise System is the Answer 
to Mitigating the Risk of FCPA Violation in International Franchise 
Expansion 
Because of the specific risks, due to the inherent reliance on third 
parties within the franchise system and the associated potential for agen-
cy or vicarious liability under the FCPA when expanding internationally, 
the franchisor must take a proactive approach to ensuring compliance 
and mitigating these risks, or risk incurring hefty penalties and fines. The 
adoption of a robust and comprehensive compliance system is the answer 
to mitigating these risks because it allows the franchisor to take a meth-
odological approach to ensuring compliance with the FCPA at all levels 
of the franchise system. In the franchise system, the key to mitigating 
risk of FCPA violation is by ensuring compliance throughout not only 
the corporate entity or family of entities, but also at the franchisee level. 
The responsibility to ensure compliance at the franchisee level is the 
most significant difference specific to international expansion in fran-
chising compared to the risks of FCPA violation associated with other 
entity structures when making foreign acquisitions or otherwise expand-
ing internationally. While the added layer of potential agency or vicari-
ous liability created by the franchisor-franchisee relationship is the core 
concern to address when adopting a robust and comprehensive compli-
ance program, it is not the only reason to do so.  
Another major reason the compliance program is the answer to mit-
igating risk under the FCPA for the internationally expanding franchisor 
is the fact that beyond just being smart business practice, doing so in-
creases transparency and shows compliance efforts on behalf of the fran-
chisor. If the enforcing agencies undertake an investigation, these agen-
cies take a more favorable view towards the company when compliance 
measures are in place and instituted system wide.86 Along these same 
lines, where a company can show adherence to its compliance program 
and the FCPA violation is based on the action of an individual, the agen-
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cies commonly will then focus on the individual in its enforcement ac-
tions and spare the company (like in the investigation involving Morgan 
Stanley and executive Garth Peterson87). To translate this into the fran-
chise system, not only may the franchisor be able to avoid being “on the 
hook” for the actions of an individual bad actor in violation of the FCPA, 
but also, if a franchisor can show it has a robust and comprehensive 
compliance program in place and its adherence to this program, it may be 
able to avoid or minimize the potential for agency or vicarious liability 
for actions taken at the subsidiary or franchisee level. As quoted in the 
Franchise Times, “Equally as important as developing a responsible cor-
porate culture, corporate compliance programs can mitigate consequenc-
es of unlawful organizational behavior for purposes of establishing the 
required punishment strictures under the Federal Sentencing Organiza-
tional Guidelines.”88 Meaning that, investigating agencies take into ac-
count the compliance efforts of a company when determining whether 
and against whom to take enforcement action and levy penalties based on 
violation of the FCPA. 
The last major argument addressed here for the franchisor taking a 
proactive approach to FCPA compliance by instituting a franchise-wide 
compliance program is simply the age old adage that “prevention is bet-
ter than cure.” Not only can an FCPA violation, whether direct or imput-
ed through principles of agency or vicarious liability, lead to the imposi-
tion of detrimental fines, the time and cost associated with investigation 
by any enforcing agency are high as well, whether due to court battles 
trying to defend against the allegations or simply the production costs 
associated with cooperating with such an investigation. Not to mention 
the reputational costs associated with being labeled as a business known 
for engaging in corrupt practices, especially considering the media’s in-
clination to sensationalize bad acting on behalf of businesses.   
Whether it is the rationale based on the potential for agency liability 
associated due to the franchisee relationship, the argument that compli-
ance is simply sound business practice, or the “prevention is better than 
cure” idea (or all three), it is clear that a proactive approach through in-
stituting a franchise-wide robust and comprehensive compliance program 
is the answer to mitigating the franchisor’s risk of liability regarding 
potential FCPA violation within its system. The next subsection will 
discuss what such a compliance program looks like in the franchise sys-
tem. 
  
 87. Effective Compliance Program Helps Investment Bank Avoid FCPA Criminal Charges, 
Baker & McKenzie (May 2012), http://web.ethisphere.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Effective-
Compliance-Program-Helps-Investment-Bank-Avoid-FCPA-Criminal-Charges.pdf. 
 88. Why Franchise Organizations Need Corporate Compliance Programs, supra note 12. 
402 DENVER LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 93 
B.  What a Robust and Comprehensive Compliance Program that Reach-
es All Levels of the Franchise System Looks Like 
From the preceding discussion and analysis as to why the adoption 
of a robust and comprehensive compliance program reaching all levels of 
the franchise system is the answer to mitigating the risks for FCPA viola-
tion associated specifically with international franchise expansion, a 
number of key elements and considerations can be assimilated that the 
franchisor should utilize when instituting its compliance program. The 
compliance program, at its most basic level, should focus on three gen-
eral principles relating to ensuring compliance to the FCPA as the fran-
chise expands internationally.89 These principles are: 1) understanding 
the potential franchisee’s qualifications and associations, including both 
its business reputation and any existing relationship with foreign offi-
cials, 2) understanding the business rationale for engaging the specific 
expansion structure and particular potential franchisee, and 3) imple-
menting some form of ongoing monitoring and auditing of the franchise 
relationship with the international franchisee.90 However, even before the 
compliance program is crafted, approaching compliance comes first from 
the cultural level within the franchise system. In addition to creating this 
culture of compliance and the particular elements crafted into the com-
pliance program, the method of adoption and implementation of the 
compliance program is how the franchisor ensures it is robust and com-
prehensive, and that adherence reaches all levels of the franchise system. 
Essentially, as stated in an article addressing risk in franchising and 7-
Eleven’s recent scandal regarding undocumented workers at a number of 
its New York and Virginia franchise locations, “if you are a US franchi-
sor, looking to expand overseas, one of the first things you should do is 
to perform a FCPA risk assessment and then use that risk assessment to 
implement a full FCPA compliance program within your company going 
forward.”91  
First, it is essential that the commitment to anti-corruption and high 
standard of business ethics be woven into the core of the franchise sys-
tem’s culture, meaning true “buy in” at all levels, not just a website tab 
on the franchisor’s corporate page that provides a kitschy anti-corruption 
motto, so that compliance becomes a clear priority throughout the organ-
ization.92 This requires the adoption of a “zero tolerance” policy by the 
franchisor, meaning the franchisor regularly evaluates the risk of corrup-
tion at every level as well as addressing compliance with such a com-
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mitment at every level by evaluating its agents’ conduct, instituting a no 
consequence internal reporting hotline, and taking action when any viola-
tion is found (including firing or severing ties with the non-compliant 
agent and taking steps to address and correct the violation internally.)93 It 
may seem that taking a zero-tolerance approach and instituting a system 
wide compliance program would indicate the franchisor having a level of 
control over its franchisees that beckons the establishment of vicarious 
liability on behalf of the franchisor, but when the control is to protect the 
system and not to manage day to day operations, the franchisor is seem-
ingly able to avoid such liability.94 The enforcing agencies, when inves-
tigating FCPA compliance, will take into account whether a company 
instituted and adhered to appropriate internal disciplinary procedures for 
compliance violations.95 Another Franchise Times article echoes this 
regarding compliance in the franchise system, “One of the best protec-
tions is to put procedures in place for dealing with incidents, such as 
bribery, should they arise. If there are good compliance procedures in 
place, even if there are incidents of corruption, the government is not as 
likely to prosecute the company, if a company can show it has made a 
substantial effort to prevent and detect such behavior, then the enforce-
ment agencies may decide to prosecute the individual rather than holding 
the entire company accountable.”96 Getting this cultural buy in at all lev-
els requires not only taking a “zero tolerance” approach and following 
through when violation or non-compliance occurs, but also educating the 
franchise’s agents at every level not only as to the extent of risk created 
by even the slightest violation of legislation, such as the FCPA, but also 
what actions constitute corruption or bribery and cause liability under 
such legislation, including the fact that what may be considered a cultural 
norm in the foreign country is irrelevant when it comes to creating a 
cause of action under the FCPA.97 Addressing compliance at the cultural 
level is only the first aspect of the franchise’ proactive approach to miti-
gating its risk for FCPA violation. 
Second, the approach to the adoption of the compliance program it-
self is key to ensuring adherence thereto at all levels of the franchise 
system, meaning ensuring that all individuals or entities within the fran-
chise system, whose actions could be imputed to the franchisor, comply 
with the anti-corruption compliance program. When crafting the pro-
gram, the franchise should consider that in past settlements and guidance 
releases, the DOJ and SEC have made clear that they look favorably on 
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compliance programs that are both designed to maximize prevention of 
wrongdoing and detection of violation within the company, and are ade-
quately enforced within the company.98 This highlights the importance of 
remembering that compliance is not an aspect of the business that is “one 
size fits all” or “check the box,” but instead, to be effective, must be tai-
lored to the particular organization’s specific needs, risks, and challenges 
regarding its international expansion. The approach to ensuring compli-
ance in its international expansion requires the franchisor to do a risk 
assessment of each particular location the franchise intends to expand, 
undertake its due diligence based on this risk assessment, and craft its 
approach to compliance based the particular risk associated and what is 
discovered through the risk-based due diligence process.99 This risk as-
sessment should include looking for any red flags regarding any third 
party agents the franchise may be working with when entering the new 
foreign market.100 In addition, when the expansion involves a merger or 
acquisition, an additional layer of due diligence specific to the target 
company pre-closing, as well as integration of the compliance based cul-
ture post-closing is necessary in order to avoid any potential imputation 
of successor liability onto the franchisor.101 The Resource Guide summa-
rizes how a company should approach compliance by stating, “In the 
end, if designed carefully, implemented earnestly, and enforced fairly, a 
company’s compliance program—no matter how large or small the or-
ganization—will allow the company generally to prevent violations, de-
tect those that do occur, and remediate them promptly and appropriate-
ly.”102 
  The compliance program and its policies and procedures should be 
designed to: 1) deter employees, agents, and franchisees from engaging 
in behavior that could lead to violation of the FCPA, 2) detect improper 
behavior should it occur, 3) incentivize and provide an internal mecha-
nism for reporting improper conduct that occurs or becomes known, and 
4) outline how senior management should respond to conduct that poten-
tially violates anti-corruption legislation.103 Specific to the franchisor, 
language regarding the franchise’s code of conduct and adherence to the 
compliance policy, as well as addressing FCPA compliance, should be 
included explicitly in the franchise agreement. For a detailed explanation 
of the key aspects the DOJ or SEC look for in any anti-corruption and 
bribery compliance program, as well as examples of what these look like 
in real life, see the Resource Guide. This Subsection’s analysis has in-
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stead focused on the aspects unique to international expansion of the 
franchise system. 
In crafting and implementing its compliance program, the franchise 
should consider the elements discussed above as well as those elements 
applicable within any entity, like showing a top down commitment, uti-
lizing the elements of the Sentencing Guidelines, and cooperating with 
any undertaken investigation.104 By doing so, the franchisor can ensure a 
robust and comprehensive approach to instilling compliance throughout 
its system, thus mitigating not only the potential for violation within its 
franchise system, but also the potential that a third-party violation be 
imputed onto the franchisor.  
C.  How the Franchisor Ensures Adherence to its Compliance Program 
at the Franchisee Level 
It seems clear that in any entity, the adoption, implementation, and 
adherence to a robust and comprehensive compliance program is the 
answer to mitigating risk of FCPA violation within the organization that 
could be imputed back to the entity. Therein, particular to franchising, 
ensuring compliance all the way through the franchisee level is the key to 
insulating the franchisor from FCPA liability. Building on Subsection 3 
above, beyond cultural integration, the most direct way the franchisor 
can make sure the program reaches franchisees is through the terms of 
the franchise agreement. The franchise agreement should expressly in-
clude provisions regarding: 1) adherence to the FCPA (and county spe-
cific anti-corruption legislation), 2) adherence to the franchisor’s compli-
ance program, and 3) non-tolerance of FCPA violation, including the 
ability to terminate the franchisor-franchisee relationship if a violation 
occurs. Making franchisees aware that the franchisor’s compliance ef-
forts “have teeth” by sharing how the franchisor evaluates compliance 
and that the franchisees’ own compliance efforts will be assessed regu-
larly to ensure their adherence to the compliance program creates incen-
tive for the franchisees to “buy-in.” Documentation of this training and 
evaluation is also an important aspect to creating a record of implementa-
tion and effort on behalf of the franchisor should an agency or vicarious 
liability claim ever arise against the franchisor regarding FCPA violation. 
These records would serve to show diligence on behalf of the franchisor 
regarding the adoption and implementation of its compliance programs 
and anti-corruption efforts. The franchisor could also show best efforts 
and automate its franchisee compliance by engaging an external compa-
ny to engage in compliance audits.105 By taking a “zero tolerance” ap-
proach to anti-corruption as well as implementing a system wide robust 
and comprehensive compliance program that incorporates the elements 
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previously discussed, as the franchisor expands internationally, the fran-
chisor can mitigate both the risk of an FCPA violation occurring as well 
as imputation of liability for any such violation onto the franchisor.  
  This section provided an answer to the unique risks regarding FCPA 
compliance that the franchise expanding internationally faces because of 
the franchise’s inherent reliance on third parties within its system, by 
posing that the adoption of a robust and comprehensive compliance pro-
gram reaching all levels of the franchise system is the answer to mitigat-
ing these franchise specific risks that potentiate liability under the FCPA. 
The section also discussed what such a compliance system looks like for 
the franchisor and provided a number core considerations to guide the 
implementation of such a program across the franchise system in order to 
mitigate the franchise specific risks created by the FCPA for the fran-
chise expanding internationally, particularly when this expansion is 
through either the acquisition of an existing foreign entity (like the pre-
viously referenced Burger King and Tim Horton’s deal) or set up of a 
master franchisor.  
V. CONCLUSION 
By adopting a commitment to non-tolerance of bribery or otherwise 
corrupt practices, as well as adopting a system-wide, robust, and com-
prehensive anti-corruption compliance program, franchises expanding 
internationally can mitigate their unique risks regarding the commission 
or imputation of potential FCPA violation within the franchise system. 
Because the DOJ has made clear its priority of ensuring compliance with 
the FCPA, echoed by the influx of enforcement actions levied annually 
and the exponential growth and expansion of the franchise sector due to 
vast success seen in most franchise systems, a franchise expanding inter-
nationally is at risk to incur a FCPA violation, and consequently investi-
gation. This paper provided an explanation of the expansive jurisdiction 
and potential causes of action created by the substantive provisions of the 
FCPA as well as an analysis of how this risk for liability under the FCPA 
translates specifically within the franchise system by virtue of its reliance 
on third parties, before providing that the solution to mitigating these 
risks to the franchisor through the adoption of a franchise-wide robust 
and comprehensive compliance program. Therein, it is clear that, alt-
hough no enforcement actions have been taken against franchisors for the 
actions of their franchisees yet, the risk of liability under the FCPA easi-
ly translates to the franchise system through the potential for vicarious or 
agency liability. Thus, the potential for applicability to the franchise ex-
panding internationally and the lack of guiding precedent as to how the 
enforcing agencies will treat franchise systems means it is critical that 
franchisors take a proactive approach to addressing compliance and miti-
gating their potential for liability under the FCPA by adopting a robust 
and comprehensive compliance program across the franchise’s system, 
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which emphasizes that bribery or other methods of easing entry into new 
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